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Rationing Rules and Outcomes: 
The Experience of Singapore’s Vehicle Quota System 
LING HUI TAN*
Since 1990, Singapore has sought to control motor vehicle ownership by means of
an auction quota system, whereby prospective vehicle buyers need to obtain a
quota license before they can make their purchase. This paper assesses the success
of the vehicle quota system in meeting its objectives of stability in motor vehicle
growth, flexibility in the motor vehicle mix, and equity among motor vehicle buy-
ers. Two important implementation issues—quota subcategorization and license
transferability—are highlighted, and policy lessons are drawn for the design of
auction quotas in general. [JEL D44, D45, R48]
S
ince 1990, Singapore has sought to control the rate of growth of its motor
vehicle population by means of a unique auction quota system. Under the
vehicle quota system (VQS), the government fixes the number of new motor vehi-
cles allowed on the road each year, then allocates approximately one-twelfth of
this annual quota to the public each month by means of a sealed bid uniform price
auction. Prospective motor vehicle buyers first have to obtain a quota license
(called a certificate of entitlement) before they are allowed to make their purchase.
There is a long-standing literature on optimal government intervention to
achieve noneconomic objectives. This literature concludes that in the presence of
the constraint that domestic consumption of a good not exceed a certain level, the
social utility maximizing policy is a consumption tax on the good.1 Assuming that
the objective is to limit motor vehicle ownership and assuming that there is perfect
competition in the motor vehicle market, an auction quota would be equivalent to
an import tariff, which, in turn—given that Singapore has no domestic automobile
*Ling Hui Tan is a Senior Economist in the European Division of the IMF Institute. She is grateful to
Mohsin Khan, Kala Krishna, Carlos Ramírez, Abdelhak Senhadji, and seminar participants at the IMF
Institute for helpful comments.
1See Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1969), for example.manufacturing industry—would be equivalent to a consumption tax. Theoretically,
therefore, it could be argued that the VQS is an efficient method of restricting the
number of new motor vehicles each year.
In practice, however, the implementation of the VQS involves many rules and
restrictions that tend to have highly distortionary effects. This paper highlights
two important implementation issues: quota subcategorization and license non-
transferability. The first issue refers to the practice of subdividing the overall
quota into smaller quotas: under the VQS, motor vehicles are classified into dif-
ferent categories based on type and size, with separate quotas for each category.
The second issue refers to the practice of prohibiting resale of quota licenses:
when the VQS was first introduced in 1990, quota licenses were transferable
across buyers, but after about a year, the quota licenses were made nontransfer-
able. These restrictions—subcategorization and nontransferability—were intro-
duced with the aim of achieving a lower and fairer tax burden; however, as the
data will show, the outcomes were not always as expected.
Much has already been written about Singapore’s VQS. However, this litera-
ture has largely considered the issue in the wider context of transportation policy
and congestion management.2 The focus of this paper is not on the effectiveness
of the VQS in addressing the problem of traffic congestion.3 Instead, the focus is
on the effectiveness of the implementation of the VQS, taking its objective of
restricting vehicle ownership as given.
Quota rationing schemes are employed throughout the world to restrict com-
modities as varied as fishery licenses and taxicab medallions. Auction quotas have
been used or considered for allocating pollution permits, import licenses, radio
frequencies, and foreign work permits, among other things. Traditionally, little
attention has been given to the implementation rules of such schemes, although
more recently Krishna and Tan (1997, 1998, 1999) have developed some theoret-
ical models of quota implementation. This paper applies theoretical and empirical
analysis to the VQS to demonstrate that quota implementation rules matter a great
deal in practice as well as in theory. Thus, the experience with the VQS so far may
offer potentially useful policy lessons in other applications.
I. The Vehicle Quota System
The VQS became effective in May 1990. Prior to that, the rate of growth of motor
vehicle ownership was controlled primarily through price-based measures, includ-
ing a road tax, an import duty on motor vehicles, a lump-sum registration fee, and
an ad valorem additional registration fee.4 Both the road tax and the additional reg-
istration fee were increased periodically, the latter from 15 percent of the motor
vehicle’s open market value in the early 1970s to 175 percent in 1990.5 From 1975
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2See Phang, Wong, and Chia (1996) and Toh and Phang (1997), for example.
3In that regard, one may argue that it would be more effective to target motor vehicle usage rather
than ownership. See Chia, Tsui, and Whalley (2001) for a fuller discussion.
4See Phang, Wong, and Chia (1996) for a description of the motor vehicle tax structure and policies
in Singapore prior to the introduction of the VQS.
5The open market value is the c.i.f. import price of the motor vehicle. It comprises the manufacturer’s
price plus freight and insurance costs.to 1989, the annual rate of motor vehicle growth averaged 4.4 percent, but with
substantial year-to-year fluctuations, with growth ranging from 9.6 percent in
1980 and 1982 to –2.7 percent in 1986.
The inability of the pricing mechanism to restrain and stabilize the motor vehi-
cle growth rate was what prompted the Singapore government to introduce a quota
system for new vehicles. The quota system operates on top of the tax measures.6 Its
purpose is to ensure that a target number of motor vehicles is maintained annually
through fixing the rate of increase of new motor vehicles each year. Thus, the VQS
is supposed to limit the volatility in the annual rate of motor vehicle population
growth, leaving motor vehicle prices to fluctuate according to the level of demand.
The VQS works in the following way. Each year, the quota for new motor vehi-
cles is determined so as to obtain a target rate of growth in the total motor vehicle
population. The quota formula is as follows:
(1)
The subscript y denotes calendar year and the subscript qy denotes quota year
(which runs from May to April). The quota is set to allow for g percent growth in
the total motor vehicle population, plus additional quota licenses to cover the num-
ber of motor vehicles that will be deregistered during the (calendar) year, plus any
unallocated quota licenses from the previous quota year. The target rate of growth,
g,w as initially fixed at 4.3 percent, then reduced to 3 percent. Initially, projected
deregistrations in year y were simply taken to be equal to actual deregistrations in
y–1,b ut from quota year 1999–2000 onwards, the authorities have employed an
undisclosed formula to project the number of deregistrations in year y. 
At the beginning of each month, approximately one-twelfth of the quota is
auctioned to the public. Prospective motor vehicle buyers have to obtain a quota
license in the appropriate category before they are allowed to make their purchase.
Any unallocated licenses are added to the quota in the next auction.
The quota licenses are sold through sealed-bid, uniform price auctions. Each
individual is allowed to submit only one bid. Each bidder is required to leave a
deposit equal to half his bid amount. The minimum bid is one (Singapore) dollar,
and bids must be in whole dollars.7 Successful bidders pay the lowest winning bid;
the difference between the quota price and the deposit amount is due at the time
of registration of the motor vehicle. (If the deposit exceeds the quota price, the dif-
ference is applied toward the buyer’s registration fees.) Unsuccessful bidders are
refunded their deposits.
Initially, the government planned to hold quarterly auctions of quota licenses:




































6Subsequent to the introduction of the VQS, the additional registration fee was reduced in two steps
to 150 percent by February 1991. The motor vehicle tax structure was further rationalized in 1998, fol-
lowing the introduction of electronic road pricing.
7The average exchange rates (Singapore dollars per U.S. dollar) during 1990–2000 were:
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— —— ——
1.81 1.73 1.63 1.62 1.53 1.42 1.41 1.48 1.67 1.69 1.72auction were valid for six months from May 1990 to October 1990, i.e., they had
to be used to register a new motor vehicle within that time period. Hence, the
quota system is considered to have taken effect from May 1990. After the first auc-
tion, the frequency of the auctions was increased to once a month, and the valid-
ity period of the quota license shortened to three months. In October 1991, the
validity period of the quota license for certain categories was lengthened to six
months (see Section IV).
The quota license has a life span of 10 years. At the end of this period, the
motor vehicle owner may either deregister the vehicle by exporting or scrapping
it, or renew the license for a further 5 or 10 years by paying what is called the
“prevailing quota price.”8 If a vehicle is sold (within the country) before the expiry
of its quota license, the quota license will be transferred to the buyer together with
the vehicle; the seller will have to bid for a new quota license if he wishes to pur-
chase a new vehicle. If a vehicle is deregistered before the expiry of the quota
license, the owner is entitled to a rebate on the quota price paid, pro-rated to the
remaining life span of the license.
Under the VQS, motor vehicles are divided into several different categories,
with a separate quota for each category. Prior to May 1999, there were seven quota
categories:
•C ategory 1: Small cars with engine capacity of 1,000 c.c. and below;
•C ategory 2: Medium-sized cars with engine capacity of 1,001 to 1,600 c.c.,
and taxis;
•C ategory 3: Large cars with engine capacity of 1,601 to 2,000 c.c.;
•C ategory 4: Luxury cars with engine capacity of 2,001 c.c. and above;
•C ategory 5: Goods vehicles and buses;
•C ategory 6: Motorcycles and scooters; and
•C ategory 7: “Open.”
Category 7 (“open”) quota licenses may be used to purchase any type of motor
vehicle.9 In May 1999, the number of categories was reduced to five: categories 1
and 2 were merged and redesignated category A; categories 3 and 4 were merged
and redesignated category B; and categories 5, 6, and 7 were renamed categories
C, D, and E, respectively. Subcategorization is discussed further in Section III.
II. Auction Outcomes: Preliminary Evidence
Has the VQS been successful in controlling the rate of motor vehicle growth? The
average annual motor vehicle growth rate during 1975–89 (prior to the introduc-
tion of the VQS) was 4.4 percent, with a standard deviation of 4.24 percent. The
average annual motor vehicle growth rate during 1990–99 (under the VQS) was
2.9 percent, with a standard deviation of 2.06 percent. Thus it appears that the
VQS has been successful in lowering the average annual rate of motor vehicle
growth and its volatility.
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8The prevailing quota price for a given quota category is computed as a three-month moving average
of the quota price of that category. (Prior to November 1998, a 12-month moving average was used.)
9Bidders of motorcycles in the open category paid one-third of the quota price in that category.There are two points worth noting here. First, the VQS targets the annual
growth of the total motor vehicle population, not the growth of new vehicle regis-
trations; the latter has ranged from 22 percent in 1999 to –8.3 percent in 1996,
partly because the quota growth rate itself has fluctuated substantially from year
to year.10 Second, the VQS has succeeded only in reducing the volatility in annual
motor vehicle growth, not eliminating it. The annual motor vehicle growth rate has
ranged from –0.3 percent (in 1992 and 1998) to 5 percent (in 1995). The motor
vehicle growth rate is determined by both the number of new motor vehicles reg-
istered and the number of motor vehicles deregistered during the year. The quota
will miss its target if the projected number of deregistrations is inaccurate (the
actual number of deregistrations each year has fluctuated between 22,000 in
1995–96 and 54,000 in 1998–99) or if the quota is underutilized.
The reduction in quantity uncertainty has been replaced with an increase in
price uncertainty. Figure 1 shows the movement of the quota prices for the seven
categories over time: the most striking feature of the graphs is the volatility of the
premiums. Although the quota prices of all categories exhibit a general upward
trend, the monthly fluctuations are sizable. Furthermore, the quota prices seem to
follow more or less the same general pattern: an initial increase, followed by a
dip in the last quarter of 1990, a rebound in the first quarter of 1991, and much
higher values thereafter. Category 6 (motorcycles) was a special case where the
quota price fell sharply in September 1991 and continued to decline to the mini-
mum bid of $1, at which it remained until March 1994. This was due to the impo-
sition of stricter emission standards effective from October 1991—most of the
motorcycles in the market at the time did not meet the standards, and redesigned
models were not expected for some time.
III. Subcategorization
As mentioned earlier, separate quotas are specified for different sizes and types of
motor vehicle. The subcategorization was introduced to allay fears that the quota
system would favor the rich. By holding separate auctions for each category, it was
envisioned that lower-income motor vehicle buyers would not have to bid against
wealthier motor vehicle buyers for quota licenses. This is particularly the case for
cars, which—up to the May 1999 auction—were subdivided into four categories
on the basis of engine capacity: small cars (category 1); medium-sized cars (cate-
gory 2); large cars (category 3); and luxury cars (category 4).
The conventional wisdom holds that subcategorization is an undesirable policy
since it can lead to situations where the quota is not binding in certain subcategories
and very binding in others, resulting in underutilization of the total quota despite a
positive quota price in the binding subcategories. This phenomenon has certainly
been observed under the VQS. As noted previously, there was a collapse in the
demand for motorcycles during 1992–93 so that the quota for category 6 licenses
Ling Hui Tan
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10During 1991/92 to 1998/99, the average annual quota growth rate was 5.2 percent, with a standard
deviation of 35.5 percent. The annual quota growth rate was as high as 57.5 percent in 1992/93 and as low
as –54.6 percent in 1994/95.RATIONING RULES AND OUTCOMES
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Figure 1. Singapore: Quota Prices, 1990–2000
(In Singapore dollars)
Source: Singapore, Land Transport Authority.
Note: In May 1999, categories 1 and 2 were merged and redesignated category A; categories 3 and 4 were
merged and redesignated category B; categories 5, 6, and 7 were renamed categories C, D, and E, respectively.
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May-90 May-92 May-94 May-96 May-98 May-00(which represented approximately 20 percent of the total quota) was not binding
during that time. As a result, the share of total quota that went unallocated was
6 percent in 1991–92, 34 percent in 1992–93, and fully 51 percent in 1993–94.11
During that time, the maximum quota price in the other categories was as high
as $65,000.
Despite this, subcategorization can be (theoretically) desirable under certain
conditions, depending on the environment and the objective of the authorities. The
rationale for subcategorization in the VQS may be analyzed using a partial equilib-
rium framework similar to Krishna and Tan’s (1997). For simplicity, consider only
two categories: category 1 (small cars) and category 2 (large cars). Assume that: (i)
the market for cars is perfectly competitive; (ii) there is no substitution across cat-
egories; (iii) all cars are imported; and (iv) Singapore is a price-taker on the world
market for each category, so that the supply of each category is horizontal at the
given world price for that category. Let Qi represent the quantity of category i cars;
Di(Qi) the inverse demand function of category i cars; and Pi the given world price
for category i cars (inclusive of taxes and other charges), where i = 1,2.
Suppose a binding quota of V units is imposed on both categories combined.
The quota will introduce a wedge between the demand price, Di(Qi), that con-
sumers are willing to pay for the restricted cars and the supply price, Pi. This
wedge, Di(Qi) – Pi measures the value of the quota license to purchase a category
i car. Left to market forces, arbitrage will ensure that the allocation of licenses
between the two categories will be such that at the margin, the value of a quota
license for a category 1 car is equal to the value of a quota license for a category
2 car. The equilibrium condition under competitive market allocation is thus:
D1(Q1) – P1 = D2(Q2) – P2, with Q1 + Q2 = V. These equations implicitly define
the equilibrium allocation of category 1 and 2 licenses under competitive market
conditions, subject to the total quota, V. Denote these equilibrium quantities as q1
and q2,r espectively, and the equilibrium quota price as L. This is illustrated in
Figure 2 where the number of category 1 cars is measured rightward from the O1
axis and the number of category 2 cars is measured leftward from the O2 axis,
where the distance between O1 and O2 is V.
But will small car buyers necessarily be squeezed out of the market in the
absence of subcategorization? Clearly, if D1(Q1) – P1 is very low relative to
D2(Q2)–P2, then q1 will be very small relative to q2; at the extreme, a corner
solution could obtain whereby q2 = V and q1 = 0. To be sure, one would expect
that at any given quantity, the inverse demand function for small cars will be
lower than that for large cars, i.e., D1(Q1)<D2(Q2), since one can think of large
cars as being of a higher quality (or providing more “services”) than small cars.12
But one would also expect that the world price of small cars will be lower than
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11In general, some 1–3.5 percent of the total quota goes unallocated each year due to the fact that no
tie-breaking procedure exists for identical bids at the cutoff level. For example, if the quota is 15 and there
are 10 bids of $15,000 and 10 bids of $10,000, then 10 licenses will be allocated at the lowest successful
bid of $15,000; the remaining 5 licenses will not be allocated but carried over to the next auction.
12Following Swan (1970), the quality of a product may be thought of as the amount of services
obtained from its consumption. These services are a homogeneous good with a uniform price. To the extent
that two products embody unequal amounts of services, they will differ in quality and, hence, in price.the price of large cars, i.e., P1 < P2. Hence, a priori there would be no reason to
expect D1(Q1) – P1 to be necessarily lower than D2(Q2) – P2, and so no reason 
to expect q1 to be necessarily smaller than q2. However, it will be true that 
L/P1 > L/P2 so the overall quota would be relatively unfair to small car buyers as
it would result in a higher tax burden for them compared to large car buyers. By
contrast, a fairer outcome could be achieved by subdividing the quota such that:
D1(Q1)/P1 = D2(Q2)/P2, with Q1 + Q2 = V. The resulting allocation will be v1 and
v2, as shown in Figure 2, such that L1 < L2 and L1/P1 = L2/P2.13
Categories 1–4: Cars
Has quota subcategorization succeeded in achieving the objective of equity? The
data indicate that the answer is no. Figure 3 plots the quota prices of categories
1, 2, 3, and 4 on the same axis. If subcategorization worked as it should have, the
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13The above analysis assumed no substitution between the two car categories. If substitution is pos-
sible, then the equilibrium market allocation of category 1 licenses will be less than q1 and the equilib-
rium allocation of category 2 licenses will be greater than q2. This is because the overall quota raises the
price of small cars relative to large cars, resulting in substitution away from the former toward the latter.
In this case, small car buyers are not being squeezed out but are voluntarily upgrading to larger cars.















Figure 3. Singapore: Quota Prices for Car Categories, 1990–2000
(In Singapore dollars)
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Cat. 1 Cat. 2 Cat. 3 Cat. 4 Cat. A Cat. Bline representing category 1 quota prices should lie everywhere below the line
representing category 2, which should in turn lie everywhere below the line rep-
resenting category 3, and so on. This is evidently not the case—as can be seen in
Figure 3, the lines intersect at several points.
Of the 106 auctions between May 1990 and April 1999, category 1 premiums
ranked the lowest of the four car categories in 86 instances (81 percent of the time);
category 2 premiums ranked second lowest in 62 instances (58 percent of the time);
category 3 premiums ranked second highest in 52 instances (49 percent of the
time); and category 4 premiums ranked highest in 57 instances (54 percent of the
time). But the desired outcome of L1 < L2 < L3 < L4 occurred in only 45 of the 106
auctions—in other words, over half of the auctions involved an instance where the
quota price for a smaller car exceeded that of a larger car. In 14 of these cases, cat-
egory 1 quota licenses cleared at a higher price than category 4 quota licenses;14 in
two instances (the November 1990 auction and the October 1998 auction), category
1 quota licenses were the most expensive of all the categories auctioned.
Even in those instances where the quota prices for smaller cars turned out to
be lower than those for larger cars, the relative tax burden still fell disproportion-
ately more on small car buyers. For example, in January 1992, the quota price was
$10,100 for category 1 cars; $16,602 for category 2 cars; $18,500 for category 3
cars; and $19,666 for category 4 cars. During that period, the open market value
averaged around $8,500 for category 1 cars; $13,500 for category 2 cars; $24,500
for category 3 cars; and $70,000 for category 4 cars. Thus, the implicit tax rate was
approximately 119 percent for category 1 cars; 123 percent for category 2 cars; 75
percent for category 3 cars; and 28 percent for category 4 cars.
These results highlight the pitfalls of subcategorization. In practice, the shape
and position of the demand curves are not known with any degree of precision, so
that fixing separate quotas for each category becomes a guessing game. As evi-
denced by the data, over half of the time one or more of the guesses have been off
the mark, with the quotas for small and medium-sized cars set too low and the
quotas for large and luxury cars set too high relative to their demands.
Category 7: The Open Category
The rationale for the open category was to introduce flexibility in the motor vehicle
mix. Quotas for the different categories are based on their proportion in the total
motor vehicle population at the end of the previous (calendar) year. It was thought
that by allowing a portion of the total quota to be “open,” i.e., usable in any category,
there would be some room for deviation from the previous year’s motor vehicle mix
based on changes in demand.
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14These 14 cases occurred between May 1990 and November 1998.for i = 1,…,6, where the subscripts y and qy are defined as before. The target
growth rate, g, is the same for all categories; as mentioned earlier, it was 4.3 per-
cent initially, later reduced to 3 percent. The parameter α was initially set at 70
percent but raised to 75 percent in December 1992. The annual quota for category
7 is simply: (1–α)(Projected total deregistrations)y.
The following example illustrates how the quotas evolve over time. Let i
denote vehicle category (i = 1,…,6); category 7 is the open category. For sim-
plicity, assume that (i) all quotas are fully utilized every year so there is no car-
ryover; (ii) a fraction δi of the previous year’s population of category i vehicles
is deregistered every year; and (iii) the deregistrations are evenly distributed
throughout the year so the quota year is effectively equivalent to a calendar year
(denoted by t). Denote quota by Vit, deregistrations by Rit, and vehicle popula-
tion by Qit.
The initial (year 1) quotas will then be: Vi1 = gQi0 + αRi1 =( g + αδi)Qi0Vi1 for
categories i = 1,...,6, and V7,1 =( 1–α)R1 for category 7, where R1 = Σ
6
i=1Ri1, and
g and α are defined as above. The total quota is V1 = Σ
6
i=1Vi1 + V7,1. Suppose a
fraction  λit of the open quota is utilized in category i,w here Σ
6
i=1λit = 1. 
Then at the end of year 1, the population of vehicle category i will be
Qi1 = Qi0 + Vi1 – Ri1 + λi1V7,1 =[ 1+g –( 1–α)δi]Qi0 + λi1(1 – α)R1. It follows
then that the rate of category i population growth will be greater than g if
λi1R1 > Ri1 (i.e., if the number of open category licenses used to register cate-
gory i vehicles exceeds the number of category i deregistrations) and less than g
if λi1R1 < Ri1. The rate of total vehicle population growth is equal to g. If there
is no open quota (α = 1), then the rate of population growth will be equal to g
for all vehicle categories, meaning that the composition of vehicles will remain
fixed at the year 0 configuration.
In year 2, the quota for category i will be: Vi2 =( g + αδi)Qi1, so the rate of
quota increase for category i vehicles will be greater than g if λi1R1 > Ri1 and less
than g if λi1R1 > Ri1. Hence, vehicle categories in which open licenses are heavily
used will experience an above-average increase in quota for a given rate of dereg-
istrations; vehicle categories in which open licenses are scarcely used will experi-
ence a below-average increase in quota.
But what determines the utilization of the open category licenses, i.e., the λits?
Intuitively, one can think of the open quota as being imposed on the aggregate
residual demand for quota licenses. Hence, as long as the open quota is not too
large, one would expect that its quota price would be close to the maximum quota
price in the other categories and that it would be used in the categories with the
highest quota prices (i.e., the categories with the most binding quotas).15 The pric-
ing of open category licenses is considered further in Section IV.
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15During 1990–99, the correlation coefficients between the quota prices in category 7 and those in the
other categories were as follows:
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 Category 5 Category 6
————— ————— ————— ————— ————— —————
0.7366 0.9097 0.9627 0.9808 0.9062 0.6456
(The correlation coefficient between category 7 and category 6 takes into account the rule that individuals
using a category 7 license to register a category 6 vehicle pay only one-third of the category 7 quota price.)Data on the usage of category 7 quota licenses are not published, but data on new
registrations indicate that the open licenses have been used mainly to purchase large
cars. This is consistent with the observation that category 3 or 4 quota prices were the
highest in 87 percent of the auctions. On average during 1990–99, the ratio of new
registrations to quota level was 95 percent for category 1, 113 percent for category 2,
195 percent for category 3, and 260 percent for category 4. In other words, the num-
ber of new category 3 cars that were actually purchased during that period was almost
double the amount set by the category 3 quota, and the number of new category 4 cars
purchased was over two and a half times the amount set by the category 4 quota. This
would have been possible only through the use of the open quota.
The composition of the car population has indeed shifted over the last ten years
toward larger cars and away from smaller cars. In 1990, the makeup of the car popu-
lation was 15 percent category 1 cars; 67 percent category 2 cars; 14 percent category
3 cars; and 4 percent category 4 cars. By 1999 the proportions had changed to 12 per-
cent category 1 cars; 60 percent category 2 cars; 20 percent category 3 cars; and 8
percent category 4 cars. In fact, according to Phang, Wong, and Chia (1996, p. 148),
“by 1995, the Mercedes Benz had overtaken the Toyota as the most popular make of
car registered in Singapore.” This increasing population of large cars has led to larger
quotas for these cars: between 1990–91 and 1998–99, category 1 and 2 quotas
declined on average by 6 percent and 1 percent per year, respectively, while category
3 and 4 quotas grew on average by 4 percent and 8 percent per year, respectively.
Therefore, it would appear that the open quota has met its objective of allow-
ing flexibility in the composition of the motor vehicle population. However, this
flexibility may be more illusory than real. The mechanism by which the open
quota allows flexibility is through price arbitrage across categories—as mentioned
above, the open quota will be used in the category with the highest license price,
or the greatest residual demand. But the objective of subcategorization was pre-
cisely to prevent price arbitrage so as to achieve a more equitable tax burden
among the different groups of car buyers. Hence the two rules are inconsistent. As
a result, the observed shift in preferences may not reflect an exogenous change in
the public’s tastes so much as a response to the quota system itself. Put differently,
the shift toward large cars may not have been because the public grew to prefer
large cars over small cars and the open quota allowed the system to accommodate
this change in preferences; rather, the shift toward large cars may have been
caused by the open category, subcategorization, and the quota formula.
An Alternative to Subcategorization: Ad Valorem Bids
The experience with quota subcategorization provides a good illustration of the dis-
tortions that come with such a practice. Although social equity is a desirable objec-
tive, quota subcategorization is not the best means by which to achieve it.
Interestingly, the authorities have so far not considered the possibility of eliminating
subcategorization and introducing ad valorem bids.16 Under such a scheme, there
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16This was first suggested by Koh and Lee (1994). The VQS review committee did consider a sug-
gestion for a single car category with a scaling factor based on the open market value of the motor vehi-
cle to be purchased, but rejected it on the basis that it would make the system “unnecessarily complex”
(www.gov.sg/mincom/mincompr/full_text5.htm, p. 3).would be only one overall quota, and potential motor vehicle buyers would bid in
terms of a percentage over the open market value of the motor vehicle rather than
in nominal (Singapore dollar) terms. In other words, auction participants would
be required to specify the extra ad valorem duty that they would be willing to pay
for their desired vehicle (in addition to existing taxes and fees).17 The equity
objective would be better served by this scheme since buyers of expensive motor
vehicles would pay the same percentage premium (relative to the price of the
motor vehicle) as buyers of less expensive vehicles.18 Under the current system
of quota subcategorization, buyers of expensive motor vehicles usually pay a
lower percentage premium (and sometimes even a lower value premium) than
buyers of less expensive vehicles. 
The idea of ad valorem bids is not unrealistic; Australia’s auction quotas for
import licenses in the 1980s utilized such a method.19 It may be argued that ad val-
orem bids could encourage underinvoicing; however, there is no reason to assume
that this would be more likely for more expensive motor vehicles than less expen-
sive ones. Furthermore, such a system would be considerably simpler than the cur-
rent system of quota subcategorization, both for the general public (by eliminating
the need for strategic decisions on which category to place a bid) as well as for the
authorities (by eliminating the need for separate auctions and complicated formu-
las for distributing the quota).
IV. Nontransferability
When the VQS was first introduced in 1990, the quota licenses were transferable:
quota licenses could be resold once for a transfer fee of $10, prior to being used
for purchasing a motor vehicle. Once a quota license was used to purchase a vehi-
cle, it became “attached” to the vehicle in the sense that the vehicle could not be
resold without the license. During the transferable period, there were no penalties
on the resale of (license-inclusive) vehicles.
In mid-1991, the local media began reporting that quota prices were at “all-
time highs.” The public placed the blame on excessive speculative activity in the
quota license market and called for additional restrictions. The government ini-
tially maintained that transferability was a desirable option as it enabled the mar-
ket to determine the allocation of rights to purchase motor vehicles according to
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17The same effect could be achieved by having a value quota rather than a volume quota, e.g., by auc-
tioning licenses that conferred the right to purchase a given dollar amount’s worth of vehicle, so that indi-
viduals desiring more expensive vehicles would have to obtain more licenses. However, a value quota
would be much harder to implement in the context of the VQS, where the objective is to control the num-
ber of motor vehicles rather than their total value.
18Falvey (1979) and Rodriguez (1979) show that unlike quotas or specific tariffs, ad valorem tariffs
do not result in a shift in the composition of imports in favor of more expensive items.
19During the 1980s, Australia auctioned import licenses for textiles, clothing, footwear, and motor
vehicles. Bidders in these auctions had to specify the category of the items, the quantity (or value) that
they were bidding for, and the ad valorem duty rate they would pay above the duty rate otherwise appli-
cable to the item. Unlike the VQS, the purpose of the Australian quota auction was primarily to obtain
information on the degree of protection to the import-competing industries and not to restrict consump-
tion; hence a comparison of the two quota systems would not be very meaningful. The point to note here
is simply that a quota system with ad valorem bids is feasible. For further information on the Australian
quota auctions, see Takacs (1994).willingness to pay, but eventually acceded to public opinion and placed restric-
tions on license resale in an effort to lower quota prices.
In October 1991, resale of quota licenses in all categories except 5 (goods
vehicles and buses) and 7 (open) was prohibited for a trial period of 12 months.
The rule change meant that a prospective motor vehicle buyer now had to bid for
a quota license in his own name instead of obtaining it from a motor vehicle dis-
tributor or from the secondary market; once a license was allocated, it could only
be used to purchase a vehicle by the individual named in the license. At the same
time, the validity period of the nontransferable quota licenses was lengthened to
six months, i.e., the vehicle purchase had to be made within half a year of buying
a license. (The validity period of category 5 and 7 licenses remained at three
months.) Transfers of ownership of motor vehicles inclusive of the quota license
were still permitted, subject to a transfer fee of 2 percent of the value of the vehi-
cle. However, in April 1995, additional restrictions were introduced to discourage
such transfers: transfers of ownership of motor vehicles registered using (non-
transferable) quota licenses from categories 1 through 4 (i.e., cars) within three
months of registration were disallowed, and transfers of ownership within four to
six months from registration were subject to an additional levy.
In the discussion that follows, license nontransferability refers to the inability
to resell the quota license before it is used to purchase a motor vehicle. Once a
quota license is used to purchase a vehicle, it can technically be transferred
(together with the vehicle), subject to the restrictions described above. However,
the nature of the transaction will be very different—the sale of a used car versus
the sale of a quota license that can be used to purchase a new car—and as such, it
will not be the focus of the following discussion.
The rationale for the switch from transferable to nontransferable quota
licenses was to eliminate speculation and thereby lower quota prices. As can be
seen in Figure 1, the initial effect of the switch was exactly what was desired, i.e.,
a drop in quota prices across the six categories affected. (The vertical lines in the
graphs mark the switch to nontransferability in October 1991.) However, this
result was short-lived, as quota prices in all the car categories continued to rise
after October 1991, reaching heights well beyond those attained when quota
licenses were transferable.20 Despite this, it was decided that the nontransferable
categories would remain nontransferable after the trial period was over.
Theoretical Considerations
In order to analyze the effect of (non)transferability on quota license prices, one
first has to understand when transferability matters and why. In a world with no
uncertainty, where every bidder knows exactly his reservation value of a quota
license, the competitive auction would function perfectly in allocating licenses
to those who value them most. There would be no scope for resale of licenses
after the auction and the secondary market would become redundant. 
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20The exception was category 6 (motorcycles) mentioned earlier.When there is some uncertainty surrounding the value of the quota licenses,
however, then transferability becomes an important consideration. Purchasing a
car in Singapore involves a considerable financial outlay and since a quota license
has to be obtained at least one month before the purchase is made, it is conceiv-
able that an individual may be uncertain of his future valuation of the quota license
at the time of the auction. 
It is often taken for granted that transferability commands a positive premium
in the presence of uncertainty; the public’s (and government’s) expectation that the
quota prices would fall when resales were prohibited reflect this assumption.21
Intuitively, one would think that a transferable quota license has an option value
in this case, as it gives its holder the option of using it to purchase a motor vehi-
cle, or selling it on the secondary market. In an uncertain world, this option has
value that should be reflected in a higher price for a transferable quota license rel-
ative to a nontransferable quota license.
However, it turns out that this conventional wisdom does not always hold in
theory. Krishna and Tan (1998, 1999) show that when quota licenses are auctioned
competitively to bidders who are uncertain about their valuation of a license at the
time of the auction, switching from transferability to nontransferability may lower
or raise the quota price. If the quota is very restrictive relative to demand, then the
transferability premium is positive; but if the quota is not very restrictive relative
to demand, then the transferability premium may be negative. 
Space constraints preclude a full elaboration of the model in the VQS context,
but the following intuition may help to explain its result.22 Consider the simplest
example where bidders have independently and identically distributed valuations;
they do not know for certain their valuations at the time of the auction but realize
them only after the auction has taken place. Hence, bidders are identical at the time
of the auction (when each knows only the distribution of his valuation) but non-
identical after the auction (when each realizes his own valuation). If resale is pro-
hibited, then at the time of the auction, each bidder will be concerned only with
his own personal valuation and will bid the expected value of the license to him-
self, regardless of how many licenses are available and how many rivals he has. If
resale is permitted, however, the auction price of a license will depend on how
much the license can be expected to cost in the secondary market, so each bidder’s
bid will depend on the others’valuations as well. This is because the licenses can
be exchanged after the auction takes place so that if the bidder is successful but his
realization turns out to be low, he may be able to sell his license to someone else
whose realization is high. Similarly, if the bidder is unsuccessful and his realiza-
tion turns out to be high, he may be able to purchase the license from a successful
bidder whose realization turned out to be low. The successful bidder therefore has
the option of using his license to buy a vehicle if his realization is high, or selling
his license to someone else if his realization is low. The value of this option, how-
ever, depends on the quota size and the number of bidders there are in the market.
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21Note that the “transferability premium” should not be confused with the “transferable quota price.”
The latter refers to the quota license price under transferability. The former refers to the difference
between the quota license price under transferability and the quota license price under nontransferability.
22The model is available from the author on request.If the quota is very restrictive, then this option is very valuable since the license
can easily be resold afterwards if the license holder’s realization turns out to be
low. As the quota increases with a given number of bidders, the possibility of
resale in the secondary market in the event of a low realization becomes smaller
since more of the demand would be satisfied in the primary auction. The option
becomes less attractive in this case. As the quota increases even further with a
fixed number of bidders, winning a license may become more of a liability than
an asset since in the event of a low realization, it may be difficult to pass it on to
someone else without taking a loss. It may then be optimal to put in a low bid and
risk having to buy the license on the secondary market. Simply put, if the quota is
very restrictive, then the secondary market quota price will be high on average,
and this is reflected in a high auction price. If the quota is not very restrictive, then
the secondary market price will be low on average, resulting in a low auction price.
Empirical Analysis
As noted earlier, the rationale for switching from transferable to nontransferable
licenses was to bring about lower quota prices. This reasoning was based on the
conventional wisdom that transferable licenses command a positive premium
because they can be retraded. However, theory shows that the conventional wisdom
is not always right: the transferability premium can be positive or negative, depend-
ing on factors such as the restrictiveness of the quota. This section turns to the
empirical evidence to determine whether the switch from transferability to non-
transferability actually raised or lowered license prices in the affected categories.
Casual observation of Figure 1 suggests that nontransferability raised rather
than lowered the quota prices in categories 1 through 4. According to the theory
outlined in the previous section, this would imply that the effective quotas for
those categories were not restrictive. However, there are other factors that may
have affected the quota prices, such as the supply of quota licenses and demand
shifts that were unrelated to nontransferability (possible factors may include
income growth and road infrastructure development, among others). In fact,
Figure 1 shows that the quota prices for category 5 (which remained transferable
throughout) were also higher after the third quarter of 1991.
In an earlier study, Koh and Lee (1993) estimate the impact of nontransferability
on the quota price by regressing the quota price on a dummy variable for transfer-
ability and other variables such as the ratio of bids received to successful bids and the
bid range, for categories 1, 2, 3, and 4 separately. They find that nontransferability
was associated with a lower quota price in category 1; had no significant effect in cat-
egory 2; and was associated with a higher quota price in categories 3 and 4.
This paper takes a different approach by looking at license prices in categories
1, 2, 3, and 4 relative to category 5. The rationale for doing this is to control for
any exogenous demand-shift factors that were common to all motor vehicles.23
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23The assumption here is that the fundamentals driving the premium for category 5 are the same as
those driving the premiums for categories 1 to 4. Robustness checks indicate that this is not unreasonable:
the license price paths of categories 1 to 5 are quite closely related to movements in domestic asset prices
in general (i.e., the stock market index).Category 5 was chosen as a base because it was not affected by the regime
switch.24
The regressions were based on the following model. Denote the relative
demand for category i licenses by: Dit = D(Lit/L5t, Bit/B5t, Dummy) where Lit
denotes the license price (in Singapore dollars) of category i at time t; Bit denotes
a demand shift parameter, such as the number of bids for category i licenses at
time t; and the dummy variable is equal to 0 for the transferability period (1990:9
to 1991:9) and 1 for the nontransferability period (1991:10 to 1999:04).25 The rel-
ative demand for category i licenses should be negatively related to the relative
price of category i licenses and positively related to the relative number of bids for
category i licenses, but could be positively or negatively related to the dummy
variable.26 On the supply side, denote the relative quota of category i licenses by
Vit/V5t. Setting demand equal to supply in equilibrium yields a reduced form such
as the following:
ln(Lit/L5t)=β0 + β1Dummyt + β2ln(Vit/V5t) + β3ln(Bit/B5t) + εit. (3)
The log transformation was used as a means of removing growth over time of
the variance of the data. Separate regressions were run for categories 1, 2, 3, and
4, using monthly auction data from September 1990 to April 1999.
If the switch to nontransferability had the desired effect, the estimated coeffi-
cient on the dummy variable β1 should be negative and significant. The coefficient
β2 is expected to be negative since all else being constant, a larger supply of cate-
gory i licenses relative to category 5 should be associated with a lower license
price for that category relative to category 5. The coefficient β3 is expected to be
positive since all else being constant, a larger number of bids received for category
i licenses relative to category 5 licenses suggests a greater relative demand for cat-
egory i licenses and hence should be associated with a higher license price for that
category relative to category 5.
Pre-regression tests indicate that the unit root hypothesis can be rejected for
all four relative license price variables—ln(L1/L5), ln(L2/L5), ln(L3/L5), and
ln(L4/L5)—using both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron
tests. The unit root hypothesis can also be rejected for the relative demand vari-
ables, ln(Bi/B5). The unit root tests for the relative quota variables, ln(Vi/V5), are
less conclusive, although weak evidence of stationarity can be found for all except
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24Also, one can reasonably assume no substitution effects between category 5 (goods vehicles and
buses) and categories 1–4 (cars). Category 7—the open category—was also unaffected by the regime
switch, but, as argued above, the quota price for category 7 is determined jointly with the quota prices of
the other categories, so the inverse demand relative to category 7 would be harder to interpret.
25It is possible that transferability/nontransferability affects not only the intercept of the demand func-
tion but also the slopes. However, the data are insufficient to allow for this (there are only 14 observations
during the transferable period).
26One may argue that the open market value of category i cars relative to category 5 vehicles should
also be included as an independent variable in the inverse demand function for category i licenses.
Unfortunately, while some information is available on these values, no consistent data series exists. This
omission is not too serious if the world prices of the different categories of vehicles move in tandem so
that their relative prices do not change much over time.ln(V1/V5). However, it can be argued in principle that the ratio of quotas should be
stationary in the long run and thus the series may be treated as stationary for pur-
poses of finite sample inference.
With this caveat in mind, the regression results are reported in Table 1. Given
that nontransferability did not affect category 5, the results indicate that non-
transferability lowered the quota price by 85 percent for categories 1 and 2, 80
percent for category 3, and 70 percent for category 4.27 The coefficients on the
other regressors have the expected signs and are statistically significant. Thus it
appears that after controlling for license supply and demand shifts (both cate-
gory-specific as well as those affecting all motor vehicles), the switch to non-
transferability in categories 1–4 lowered their quota prices by some 70–85
percent relative to the transferable regime. Although this effect seems substantial,
it should be considered in the context of the actual change in license prices.
Between the transferable period (1990:05–1991:09) and the nontransferable
period (1991:10–1999:04), the average license price rose by 471 percent in cat-
egory 1; 572 percent in category 2; 556 percent in category 3; and 795 percent
in category 4. In other words, all else being constant, the switch from transfer-
ability to nontransferability lowered the quota prices by 70–85 percent; but all
else was not constant, and the actual change in prices observed after the switch
was an increase of about 500 percent or more. The regression results imply that
had the switch from transferability to nontransferability not taken place, the
license price increase between the two periods would have been 556 percent in
category 1; 656 percent in category 2; 635 percent in category 3; and 865 per-
cent in category 4. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that nontransferability
does carry costs that are difficult to quantify. As demonstrated in Krishna and Tan
(1998, 1999), welfare—defined as the sum of surplus and quota rent—is gener-
ally lower under nontransferability compared with transferability.
Finally, an estimate of the transferability premium associated with the open cat-
egory license may be obtained by comparing the category 7 quota price against the
maximum quota price (excluding category 7) in the same auction. Recall that open
quota licenses remained transferable throughout the sample period. It can be shown
that when the other categories are also transferable, the open quota price will be
equal to the highest quota price of all the categories (assuming the open quota is not
large enough for complete arbitrage), whereas when the other categories are non-
transferable, the open quota price should exceed the maximum quota price.
Intuitively, this may be understood by noting that if the individual purchases a non-
transferable—say, category 4—license, his actual surplus may be positive (if his
realization turns out to be above what he paid at the auction) or negative (if his real-
ization turns out to be below what he paid at the auction), but if he purchases an
open license, his actual surplus cannot be negative since he can always resell the
license if his realization turns out to be below what he paid at the auction. Thus in
order for him to be indifferent between the two options, the transferable open
license will have to cost more than the nontransferable category 4 license.
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27Following Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), the percentage effect of the dummy variable on
(Lit/L5t) is calculated as 100(exp(β1)–1).A log-linear regression of the open quota price relative to the maximum quota
price, L7/Lmax, on a constant and the transferability dummy (0 for the transferable
period; 1 for the nontransferable period) yields the following result:
ln(L7/Lmax)=–0.069 + 0.045 Dummy (4)
(0.053) (0.054)
106 observations; R2 = 0.019; Adjusted R2 = 0.009;
S.E. of regression = 0.114; DW statistic = 1.892;
Standard errors (heteroskedasticity-consistent) in parentheses;
Q(4) = 1.669 (p-value 0.796); Q(8) = 4.391 (p-value 0.820); Q(12) = 7.382 (p-value 0.831)
DF test statistic for ln(L7/Lmax) = –10.537; reject unit root at 1 percent level.
Ling Hui Tan
454
Table 1. Regression Results
Dependent Variable:
ln(Li/L5) i = 1 i = 2 i = 3 i = 4
Constant 1.009* 2.594* 1.432** 0.980
(0.414) (0.401) (0.887) (0.967)
Dummy –1.934* –1.880* –1.578* –1.220*
(0= transferable; (0.260) (0.328) (0.452) (0.330)
1=nontransferable)
ln(Vi/V5) –1.703* –1.732* –1.901* –0.967*
(0.352) (0.418) (0.771) (0.433)
ln(Bi/B5)0 .911* 1.340* 1.347* 0.576*
(0.166) (0.212) (1.271) (0.169)
AR parameters:
AR(1) 0.554* 0.583* 0.389* 0.491*
(0.099) (0.095) (0.110) (0.090)
AR(2) –0.169**
(0.098)
Number of  103 104 104 104
observations
R2 0.711 0.716 0.403 0.529
Adjusted R2 0.696 0.705 0.378 0.510
S.E. of regression 0.523 0.485 0.880 0.557
Q(4) 2.578 [0.275] 0.251 [0.969] 2.849 [0.415] 0.578 [0.901]
4.350 [0.629] 5.198 [0.636] 5.307 [0.623] 4.076 [0.771]
Q(8) 7.809 [0.647] 10.798 [0.460] 6.690 [0.824] 5.729 [0.891]
Q(12)
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. L denotes quota price (in dollars); V denotes
quota level (in number of vehicles); B denotes number of bids; subscripts denote license category.
Equation (1) was estimated as an AR(2) model; Equations (2)–(4) were estimated as AR(1). Q(k)
denotes the Ljung-Box Q-statistic with k lags; figures in square brackets are the corresponding
p-values. * and  ** indicate significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.The constant is negative but not significantly different from 0, implying that
L7/Lmax is not significantly different from 1 under transferability. Nontransfer-
ability (of categories 1–4) is associated with an increase in L7/Lmax,b ut the
increase is not statistically significant. This suggests that the transferability pre-
mium on the open quota was negligible. However, this finding may be partly due
to the fact that the transferable open category licenses had to be used within a
shorter time period than the nontransferable category 1–4 licenses. (As men-
tioned earlier, the switch to nontransferability for categories 1–4 was accompa-
nied by a lengthening of the validity period of those licenses from three months
to six months, while the validity period of the transferable open category licenses
remained at three months.)
V. Conclusions and Policy Lessons
Singapore’s experience with the VQS demonstrates that quota implementation can
turn out to be quite complicated. The original aim of the VQS was to control the
growth rate of the motor vehicle population as efficiently and fairly as possible.
Theoretically, one could argue that a quota would be an optimal policy to achieve
this aim. However, as this paper serves to highlight, the actual implementation of
the quota makes a difference as seemingly rational rules may have unexpected and
undesirable consequences. Singapore’s experience with the VQS offers some
potential lessons for quota implementation in general.
The first lesson highlighted in the paper is that whereas a reasonable theoret-
ical case may be made for quota subcategorization, in practice the relevant infor-
mation for setting the individual quotas is often lacking, so that the end result may
not be the desired one. In the case of the VQS, the rationale for subcategorization
was to ensure social equity in the sense that buyers of small inexpensive cars
should not have to pay the same quota price as buyers of expensive luxury cars.
But in practice, subcategorization led to a highly regressive outcome, with buyers
of inexpensive cars paying more in relative—and, in some cases, absolute—terms
than buyers of expensive cars.
A related point is the importance of consistency among the rules. It is logically
inconsistent to have subcategorization for social equity together with an open cat-
egory for flexibility as the aim of subcategorization is to have different quota
prices for different categories, whereas the open category works in the opposite
direction, through price arbitrage across categories. Hence, the present design of
the VQS cannot achieve both social equity and flexibility at the same time.
Switching to a single quota with ad valorem bids would take care of these con-
siderations automatically and greatly simplify the system as well. Although it is
somewhat unusual to require that bidders specify an ad valorem tax rate rather
than a nominal (Singapore dollar) bid amount, this has been implemented in other
countries, notably in Australia’s quota tariffication exercise during the 1980s. Ad
valorem bids would encourage the public to think of the quota license more cor-
rectly as a tax on the motor vehicle rather than as an asset in its own right. Such a
tax would at least be proportional rather than regressive, and doing away with the
subcategorization should substantially reduce quota administrative costs.
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Another lesson is that making the quota licenses transferable (or nontransfer-
able) has non-obvious implications for the quota price. Although it is often
assumed that the transferability premium is positive, theoretically it can be shown
that this need not be the case, depending on the restrictiveness of the quota. In the
case of the VQS, it appears that after controlling for license supply and demand
factors, the switch to nontransferability did have the desired dampening effect on
the quota prices of the car categories, although this effect was overwhelmed by
other developments that caused an outward shift of the demand for motor vehicle
licenses. Further, this effect should be weighed against the disadvantages of non-
transferability, namely the loss of flexibility in an uncertain environment and the
consequent deterioration in welfare.
As an ongoing experiment in auction quota implementation, the VQS offers
many other potential lessons that are worth exploring. The government has
recently replaced the sealed bid auction system with “open” bidding whereby
potential bidders are able to observe others’bids before submitting their own. The
argument is that the sealed bid system encourages excessively high bids so
increased transparency should result in lower quota prices. The issue is worth
studying in greater detail when sufficient data become available.
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